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Obedience, Choice, and Agency for the Military Officer
Reuben Brigety
Dean of the Elliott School of International Affairs of  
The George Washington University
Ladies and Gentlemen, good morning. Shannon, George, Marty, other 
friends, colleagues, it’s my great honor to be with you here in the balmy 
climate of Cleveland, to help start off this amazing conference. Let me also 
again congratulate you, Shannon, and the Inamori Center for all the work 
you’ve done here over the years and for this amazing new facility that you have.
What I’d like to do with my remarks, which I hope we can follow with a 
robust conversation to get us going, is think through the question of strategic 
dissent for the military officer and also by extension by others, civilians 
that may also be involved in the defense and national security enterprise. 
It has been some time since I’ve been an active scholar of military ethics. 
However, in the time that I’ve been away from scholarship, I’ve been busy 
and have lived these issues both as a practitioner in the field in working on 
not only a series of refugee and policy related issues in Africa, but also a 
series of working closely with my military colleagues on a series of direct 
action military matters as well. I bring that sensibility as well to the work 
that we do at the Elliott School, which I’ll talk about at the end of my talk.
I say all that to say that while I have been away from the subject as an 
active scholar, I continue to be interested, at times even obsessed, with the 
question of dissent—its role in not only the shaping and conduct of policy, 
but also its role in a very personal matter, a very personal way for the indi-
vidual that is often charged with executing, or standing by, or watching 
some of the most weighty events, not only of national security, but frankly 
of import for individual human lives. One of the reasons that I find the 
question of dissent of particular importance in the military context is that, 
of course, at first look it seemed to be antithetical to the entire military 
enterprise. Lisa Layman might suggest that that might be the case.
Why might that be the case? Because, again, from not only from the 
outside, but also from a series of strictures how military life is governed. 
Obedience and discipline are at the core of the military profession, and not 
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not simply arbitrarily, but because, of course, discipline, which implies 
obedience to orders, certainly obedience to legal orders, is necessary in 
order to break through or control the so-called fog of war and the sorts of 
chaos that happens in the battlefield. That, therefore, is necessary in order 
to achieve victory on the battlefield or at sea. That is also necessary in order, 
as Auschwitz aficionados would recognize, to achieve the political objec-
tives for which one uses force in the first place. If one follows that train of 
logic, one can assume by the transit of property of ethics that obedience is 
tied to achieving the political ends for the use of force.
What happens, however, if that theory is wrong or if, on certain occa-
sions, one can actually help achieve the political objectives for which one 
is actually engaging in the use of force, not by obeying, but by dissenting? 
There are any number of models, any number of circumstances, any number 
of real world examples by which one can suggest this actually might be the 
theory that we ought to be thinking about, at least in certain circumstances, 
whether it be the very well known, well-publicized examples of My Lai on 
the one hand and Abu Ghraib on the other. Or whether it be any number 
of drone strikes that may have led to civilian casualties in environments 
where one had hoped they were trying to actually cultivate the population 
to support our political objectives, even as one prosecutes conflict against 
known or suspected terrorist subjects. Or leave aside the question of these 
high stakes, high profile uses of force.
What if what we’re talking about in certain circumstances is the ability 
to dissent against an officer or a superior that one knows is taking illegal 
or unethical action, whether it be accepting a dinner party, or access to 
prostitutes, or Lady Gaga tickets when a junior officer thinks that might 
not be the case? Or what if what we’re talking about is not on that level of 
professional personal conduct, but rather broader questions of policy? What 
role is there for the officer who thinks, “You know, I’m not sure that the 
intelligence actually suggests that there’s weapons of mass destruction in 
this particular location?” What is one supposed to do?
Of course this is important, not only from these sorts of real world 
examples, but also frankly from questions of ethical theory, because as 
those of you who obviously are far more esteemed in the area of profes-
sional ethics know, one of the most important questions of ethics is not 
only how do we know what is ethical, but also the question of agency. In 
essence, it is almost irrelevant, certainly merely academic if one is simply 
talking about what the right ethical decision is if the individual actor does 
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not have the quality of agency to be able to make an informed decision 
and indeed be able to act on whatever the ethical analysis may be. Herein 
lies the fundamental rub for the military officer. On the one hand, she is 
trained to obey orders. She’s also trained to assume that the chain of com-
mand by which she receives these orders is acting legally, acting ethically, 
and also acting in support of the national interest.
If that is the default position of the institution, then . . . there are several 
questions that result from that. The first is, how do you know that that 
series of assumptions is actually operative, which is to say that the orders 
that one receives are legal, are ethical, and are in the national interest? Sec-
ond, let’s assume that one can accept the legal analysis. What is the ethical 
framework by which one is even to interpret even what might essentially 
otherwise be legal orders? Is it one’s own personal religious conviction? Is 
it what one understands to be the broader ethical frame of one’s country? 
Is it something else, and how does one have access, and how does one be 
able to adjudicate those sorts of ethical choices?
The third really quite important question is that even if one can identify 
the right level of analysis, are we talking about battlefield decision? Are we 
talking about high policy? Are we talking about questions of individual 
conduct? Even if one can affirmatively understand the normative structures 
that are available to help adjudicate those questions, whether it be matters 
of law or ethics, then you get to one series of systemic issues. What systems 
are in place to be able to actively act on such dissent, or at least to be able 
to raise such questions? This is actually a crucially important point and it’s 
crucially important if, for no other reason, that there are actually multiple 
different models that are available, not only in the military, but amongst 
different militaries and indeed amongst different professions.
Let me give you a couple of examples. As George mentioned, I spent six 
years in the State Department. One, the US State Department was modeled, 
the Foreign Service State Department was modeled on the US military, 
so, although they don’t wear uniforms, there is obviously a question of 
hierarchy. There are ranks that are meant to be expected and it’s also based 
on the general proposition that particularly when you’re trying to imple-
ment and execute policy halfway around the world, there has to be some 
level of discipline between what is decided in capitols and what is actually 
executed on the ground, in that sense, not unlike sending a ship at sea.
Yet, because one’s thinking about these questions of policy that can 
often be complicated, there is, as you may know, a formal dissent channel 
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within the State Department, through which any diplomat can actually 
raise questions or concerns about the policy that he is actually meant to 
actually execute. Not only is there a formal channel for dissent, there is 
(at least there used to be prior to) in the previous administration, there 
traditionally has been a formal reward for the best dissent report in the State 
Department on any given year. Why is that important? Because it shows to 
the institution what respectful dissent ought to look like, and how it ought 
to be rewarded, and what the expectations are of the institution for how 
dissent can actually be valuable to the mission of the institution as a whole.
Let’s take another example from medicine, which is another discipline 
where particularly in the context of surgery or triage, there is hierarchy from 
physicians, to nurses, to physician assistants, etc., where there is an expectation 
that a doctor’s request for the patient will be followed. In fact, those requests 
are called orders in the medical environment, and also where there is the 
assumption that in the operating theater, the surgeon is the highest authority, 
not only as a matter of law, but because the surgeon has the most in technical 
experience about the procedure. As a result of a series of challenges with 
regard to medical mistakes in the United States over the last decade, what is 
now common practice serving in surgery rooms across the United States, is 
that everybody in the operating theater is now empowered, whether they are 
the surgeon, or a nurse, or a surgical tech to stop or raise their hand at any 
given time to say, “I see something that does not look right,” even if they 
may not happen to be the most senior person in the room.
I raise this to say that, and there are other examples from aviation. There 
are other examples from oil drilling, particularly in light of the Deepwater 
Horizon fiasco and others. There are other examples in which one is actu-
ally from other disciplines, from other professions, in which one actually 
recognizes, not only that dissent is not inherently bad, but actually can be 
vital to achieving the appropriate mission of the institution, and they have 
enabled systems to be able to do that.
The final question that I have and the final area that I would posit for 
discussion, is that in addition to levels of analysis, in addition to questions of 
the moral framework to make decisions, in addition to questions of system, 
are questions of training and incentives. This is the most difficult part, I 
would argue, certainly in the military context. How does one simultane-
ously train a person to charge the hill, to take out the machine gun nest, 
and to obey the lawful order of those appointed over them and also train 
them to not only be comfortable with, but indeed the necessity of speaking 
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up with dissent when they see that something is antithetical to the mission, 
values, law that govern the organization? I would submit to you that this 
is the greatest challenge that certainly in the context of multiple military 
environments that we face. It’s a challenge for a variety of reasons.
One, even for the most wise, experienced amongst us, living with those 
two fundamental tensions in one’s head, even in an academic environment, 
is incredibly challenging. It’s even more challenging under the strains of 
real world operations, when you’re really at sea or you’re really engaged 
in combat, and the people against whom you must dissent are also the 
people on who you must depend for your own life. That’s really hard, and 
yet, don’t we all wish that more people had more of a desire to speak up 
earlier during Abu Ghraib? Don’t we all wish that more people had the 
opportunity to speak up and challenge Lt. Calley earlier, so that My Lai 
would never have been a stain on the record of the United States in the 
first place? Don’t we all wish that more Lt. Commanders, or Commanders, 
or Jr. Lieutenants had said something when they saw this contractor in the 
7th Fleet doing all kinds of shady things, that have now fundamentally 
upset an entire generation of Naval officers and put into question frankly 
our entire position in all of East Asia from a Naval perspective?
I don’t know what the answers to these four questions are on a practi-
cal basis. As I say, I have to run a school so I don’t have as much time to 
actually sort of think about them myself, but I do know that these are the 
questions, at least these four, that must dominate our thinking in this area. 
Accordingly, one of the things—although I don’t have time to write about 
it—one of the great things about being Dean is that you actually have an 
opportunity to set up programs. One of the things that we have done, 
two things we’ve done at the Elliott School (which George said correctly, 
is the largest school of international affairs in the United States—we have 
almost 3,200 students) is we have articulated a vision for what we’re doing 
at the Elliott School— this is—that we characterize it as the acronym 
STEP, S-T-E-P, which stands for achieving elite excellence in scholarship, 
teaching, ethics, and practice.
The reason we have ethics in our core mission, as I tell all of our students, 
that international affair students are a special breed of student, because by 
definition they care about the state of the world and they want to prepare 
themselves to go off and fight the world’s fight. “If you do so,” I tell our stu-
dents, “I can guarantee you, you will face very challenging ethical problems. 
Thus, it is vital for us, while you are here in our scholarly community, that 
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we give you the best preparation to know what doing the right thing feels 
like, and that we also give you, not only the background knowledge, but 
help to sort of develop your courage to be able to do the right thing when 
your time of questioning comes.”
Accordingly, the second thing we’ve done is we’ve established something 
that we’re calling the LEAP Academy, which stands for the Leadership Ethics 
and Practice Academy, which amongst other things has, as its responsibil-
ity, teaching ethics across all of our curricula for our international affair 
students at the undergraduate and graduate level, creating a series of lecture 
series and other events to actually show our students what practical, ethical 
decision-making actually looks like, and the fact that you can actually make 
ethical decisions and survive. You can actually dissent without having to 
throw away your career. You can actually stand up and be counted and live 
to tell the story as opposed to the fears that if one stands up in a variety of 
different ways, that will be the very last thing that you can do.
We’re doing so, as I say, because we think that not only is it important 
for us to do, but quite frankly we also hope that other similarly placed 
institutions will also place a similar importance on ethics in international 
affairs, because we don’t see this as a competition. We actually sort of see this 
as part of the community. All of us are trying to do our very best to train 
the next generation of young people to go off and fight the world’s fight.
Let me conclude my opening remarks before we go into what I hope will 
be an interesting question and answer session debated amongst ourselves, 
by reiterating something that George said, and that is that what all of you 
are doing as scholars and also as practitioners in this space of professional 
military ethics could not be more vital and could not be more timely. One 
only has to take a look not only at the series of headlines that are happening 
politically in all of our countries, but also take a look at the really quite 
serious security challenges that we’re facing in multiple parts of the world, 
and note that in addition to having the technical expertise to solve them, 
we also need people that are rooted in questions of fundamentally human 
dignity and also rooted in what it takes, as Dr. Inamori says, what does it 
take to be a decent human being and to bring that sensibility to their work?
Thank you very much. I look forward to our questions and more 
importantly, I wish you all the best for this wonderful conference here in 
Cleveland. Thank you.
6
The International Journal of Ethical Leadership, Vol. 5 [2018], Art. 13
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/ijel/vol5/iss1/13
The International Journal of Ethical Leadership   Fall 2018 46
french: First taker.
brigety: Yes, Dr. . . . 
audience male 1: [inaudible]
brigety: I’m sorry. Before you say it, I actually sort of . . . I’ve learned 
something. I now know that in order to be the Editor of the Journal of 
Professional Military Ethics, your last name needs to be Cook and you need 
to be either currently or have been employed in the United States Air Force 
Academy, so I guess I’m doubly out. But please, continue.
audience male 1: Nice to see you.
brigety: Yes, sir.
audience male 1: Two quicks. In the U.S. military, starting with 
the work of Don Snider in the Army about 20 years ago, a lot of the ques-
tions were interested in the framework of the question, is military service 
a profession or are we merely obedient bureaucrats, as Snider would put it?
brigety: Right.
audience male 1: And a lot of the training that’s going on through 
the organizations in the army to stress the importance of helping people 
think of themselves as professionals.
brigety: Yes.
audience male 1: But one of the implications of that is, if you’re 
truly a professional, then there’s an internal ethic of things that you will 
and you won’t do.
brigety: Yes.
audience male 1: There are things you could ask your doctor to do 
for you that they would simply refuse on the grounds . . . 
brigety: That’s correct.
audience male 1: . . . that I can’t do that . . . 
brigety: That’s correct.
audience male 1: . . . in a way that’s consistent with my professional 
obligation.
brigety: That’s correct.
audience male 1: But they’re clearly, the professions that you listed, 
are more firmly on the professional side and less on the bureaucratic side . . . 
7
Brigety: Strategic Dissent: Obedience, Choice, and Agency for the Military
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 2018
47Brigety  Strategic Dissent
brigety: Yes.
audience male 1: . . . than military service. Any thoughts about how 
that balance will help us either clarify or muddy the waters?
brigety: Yes.
audience male 1: Then the second point, an area I’ve gotten really 
interested in the last few years, is when military people talk about ethics, they 
talk usually in Aristotelian terms, in terms of character and integrity, and the 
ideas that individuals have these characteristics, and if they have them, then 
they’re reliable, and they would be good to go in kind of any environment. 
But the literature and moral psychology shows that in fact context affects 
people’s behavior . . .  
brigety: Yes.
audience male 1: . . . to almost incredibly counterintuitive ways, and 
so when you look at something like, oh, Fat Leonard scandal in 7th Fleet, 
my prediction is what’s going to turn out to be true there is we send a few 
bad people there, but we also had a really bad environment in 7th Fleet.
brigety: Yes. Yes.
audience male 1: That signaled the people that when you come out 
here, unless you really want to be the standout, as the newbie you want 
to fit in.
brigety: Right.
audience male 1: All military organizations are like that and so 
whatever the espoused ethic of the organization is, we all know individual 
units have different ethics based on those environmental factors. You expe-
rienced that, I’m sure, within the State Department . . . 
brigety: Yes.
audience male 1: . . . in different subcultures in State. Just those two 
points. Any reflection about that?
brigety: Sure. I think those are both excellent questions. First on the 
issue of whether or not the military is a profession or a collection of organized 
bureaucrats and what the implications of that are, I fall firmly, hardly on 
the side that it is a profession and must be a profession. Now, I don’t think 
that the fact that it is a profession necessarily, and I’ll come back to why I 
think that in a moment, I don’t think that the fact that it’s a profession is 
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necessarily in tension with the law or legal strictures, because all of the other 
professions that I talked about, for example medicine, right, or the law, the 
law, that is a profession, I mean, not only are their canons of professional 
ethics but they’re also governed by various state and in some cases federal law, 
about what they can or can’t do, which is part of the reason why you need 
a license to practice, part of the reason why you can be sued, etc., etc., etc. 
 The fact that, for example, there is, in the U.S. context and with its analogs 
elsewhere, the U.S. Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), which requires 
certain legal aspects, certainly in regards to obedience, and obedience to orders 
necessarily, doesn’t necessarily mean that there cannot be as well an accompa-
nying, perhaps sometimes even a superseding code of ethics that goes above 
and beyond what the law in any particular case requires. Let me give you what 
I think is sort of the nightmare example of this. I’m going to try to state this as 
apolitically as I can based on what I understand to be some of the discussion. 
 In light of the rising tensions between the United States and North Korea 
on the Korean peninsula, with many in the foreign policy community, 
particularly in that horrid bastion of elitist sort of people that get it wrong, 
the Council on Foreign Relations, there is serious, has been serious con-
cern that we have been at the closest possibility of a real world nuclear 
exchange since the Cuban Missile Crisis. As a result of this, there have been 
a number of rumors, none of which I have seen corroborated, but, which I 
have seen reported multiple times in what I would consider to be credible 
news outlets and also very real discussion as of matters of law about who 
has the authority to actually launch American nuclear weapons and does 
the President of the United States have sole authority to be able to do that. 
 As those who, particularly that I see at least one submariner in the audience, 
we know that America’s nuclear deterrent was built for maximum efficiency 
and response time and less to create multiple redundancies for reflection 
at the highest levels. There are redundancies at the tactical level, dual key, 
whatever, but certainly at the highest level, the national command authority, 
one can reasonably ask, for senior military officers or senior civilians that 
are closest to the President and are part of the NCA, is there a professional 
military ethic of dissent or disobedience that could reasonably be called for 
in an environment where it is unclear that the launch of a nuclear weapon, 
particularly given the politics around that, is in the best interest of the country? 
 Now, that is not simply my assertion. As we know, this has actually been 
really quite actively sort of debated. But there are any number of other sort 
of further examples further down the line. I would, for example, refer you 
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to, you know, one of our scholar at the Elliott School is a scholar named 
Hugh Gusterson. Many of you may know his work. He wrote this book 
last year called Drone, which talks about some of the ethics of use of remote 
vehicles or whatnot, and then I think that presents a whole other series of 
questions, so I fall firmly on the question that it must be a profession, that 
the nature of profession actually helps psychologically the individual military 
member, and that frankly we would actually do better, not only to embrace 
it as a profession, but actually not only as medicine and law has done, but 
actually do an awful lot more to tease out what that means, in particular 
as it relates to matters of dissent and what those lines of ethical beyond 
simply obeying lawful orders, what are the lines of appropriate conduct. 
 Which then gets to the second question. I also firmly believe that in addi-
tion to whatever anyone’s individual predilections may be, context matters 
greatly. I absolutely believe that. I also believe, frankly, that in most cases 
most people are capable of most things, given the right or wrong set of cir-
cumstances. Our institutions assume that, which is not only why we sort of 
focus so much on the rule of law, but also why we spend so much time on 
training ethics. It’s why we go to houses of worship regularly, because it’s not 
the assumption that, for example, I’m a Christian, I would never say, “Yeah, I 
went to Sunday School once back in 1987. I’m good. I got it. Thank you very 
much,” right? I mean, you sort of continue to exercise that ethical framework 
a great deal at an individual level, but it’s also why it’s crucially important for 
individual leaders and also for institutions to create that enabling environment. 
 If I may, I know we’re live streaming, so I’m going to be very careful 
about how I say this next piece. The Fat Leonard scandal has, as I men-
tioned, sucked up an entire generation, maybe even two generations of naval 
officers, two of which I happen to know. They were both in my company 
when I was a Midshipmen in the Naval Academy. One happened to be a 
classmate of mine. The other happened to be a First Class Midshipman 
at Senior. One of whom, would have been the last person in the world 
I ever would have expected to be sucked into this environment literally. 
 As a matter of record, I have no independent knowledge of what I’m about 
say, but what I suspect could have happened is that this person, because of what 
I knew about him and also what I knew about his past conduct, probably tried 
to do the right thing initially, and then as a result of the total environment, as a 
result of what was happening amongst his superiors and seniors, eventually as, 
because we know what Fat Leonard’s MO was, you know it got brought in a 
little bit closer, a little bit closer, and a little bit closer, and then decides, “Well, 
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am I really going to be the sucker who’s going to try to be the Boy Scout 
when clearly everybody knows that this is how business is done out here?” 
 One of the things I wonder is, how did the system fail somebody like that? 
In addition to whatever his own clear personal feelings were, why do we have 
a . . . What was happening such that so many other people who otherwise had 
very distinguished careers, then went to all the appropriate accession sources. 
They had all the mandatory ethical training. They’d all took their kids to 
synagogue, or a temple, or whatever on Sundays or Fridays, whatever. How 
did so many people get this so wrong over such a long period of time? I 
have to think that part of it is that we somehow failed systemically to create 
strictures where junior people at sea in very challenging environments far 
away from the flagpole were sufficiently empowered to be able to challenge 
what is clearly wrong behavior. Had we been able to shift that and created 
better strictures, it would have saved everybody an awful lot of heartache. 
 I actually have a rule when I do teaching and that rule is I insist on gender 
parity in questions, so I go gentlemen, ladies, gentlemen, ladies, so I’m going 
to open the floor to ladies first, and then we’ll go back to another gentlemen. 
You’re promised you’ll be next. Ladies, is there a question? Yes Ma’am?
audience female 1: Hi. My name is Lisa.
brigety: We need you to wait for the microphone.
audience female 1: Hi. My name is Lisa. I’m a military ethics MA 
student here at Case Western. My question had to do with what you were 
talking about with training and having people able to be able to dissent.
brigety: Yes.
audience female 1: One of the things that I was looking at in 
research was the lack of ethical training for enlisted members. This is just 
kind of my opinion, but it looks like, from what I’ve seen, there’s a little 
bit of a bias against just regular enlisted members, thinking maybe they 
can’t handle it. It’s too much for them in terms of scholarship. How would 
you kind of recommend tying those two things together . . . 
brigety:: Yeah.
audience female 1: . . . so that you have enlisted members who have 
an ethical framework to work with to be able to know when they can dissent 
and then also to be able to have this system in place for them to dissent in 
what’s a respectful and a useful way?
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brigety: Right. That’s a great question, because it begs questions of 
sociology, begs questions of ethics, begs questions of the law. Let me just 
try to address it a little bit. Again, I can’t claim any authority, maybe 
not even familiarity with what happens in our military from sister coun-
tries, but in the US military, for example in the US Marine Core the 
oaths that are taken by officers and enlisted people are different. As you 
know, the oath for an officer, “I solemnly swear to support and defend 
the Constitution of the United States, yada, yada, yada, so help me 
God.” For a . . . Sorry, you know I get into it. I meant every word of it. 
For an enlisted person the oath includes, “And I promise to obey the 
lawful orders of those appointed over me.” That part of the oath does 
not exist in the officer oath. It’s written into what we expect of them. 
 I think and this is where I think kind of, a sociological aspect comes 
in, because, of course traditionally over centuries the officer core was 
drawn from a more highly educated elite social class while the enlisted 
ranks across services were drawn from lower socioeconomic classes. While 
some of that still exists, certainly in the American context, not only do 
we have the most highly educated military we have ever had at both the 
enlisted and officer levels, we also are operating environments increas-
ingly, whereas, you know General Chuck Krulak is famous for coining the 
phrase, “The strategic corporal,” right? The notion that even an enlisted 
person who’s standing at checkpoint, or guarding a prison, or manning 
a launch site, or anything else can be placed in the position where their 
choices can actually have strategic consequences. If that is the case, I com-
pletely agree with you that we ought to be thinking about the ques-
tions of dissent, not only for officers, but also for enlisted people, even 
understanding that still the nature of their oaths, and the scopes of their 
presumed responsibility in the normal course of their duties are different. 
 Now, one of the other things I think it’s important to note, and certainly in 
the context of a series of unfortunate training accidents going back a decade-
and-a-half, we now at least have the, in training environment bootcamps and 
A schools, and things of that nature, have the concept of a training timeout, 
right? You know, so I, Private Schmotz, feel like I’m about to have a heart 
attack when we’re on this run. “Call a training timeout.” It’s technically pos-
sible, but you better be right. But again this goes back to all the other sorts of 
things that we talked about before, that even if the presumption is obedience, 
that it’s also important to train on dissent, to train and practice it, so that 
members of the military and civilians who work with them as well know, 
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like increasingly we do in the State Department, what appropriate dissent 
looks like, what appropriate dissent feels like, and also how one can dissent 
as a way of actually protecting both the mission and the institution itself. 
 Yes Sir?
audience male 2: Well, I’m [inaudible] Fellow at the Stockdale 
Center at Naval Academy this year.
brigety: Go Navy! Beat Army!
audience male 2: Indeed.
brigety: Next year.
audience male 2: I wanted to address the three assumptions that 
you mentioned.
brigety: Sure.
audience male 2: In terms of the norm of obedience.
brigety: Right.
audience male 2: Those seem to be the grounds of what you con-
sider to be appropriate dissent. The first being legality. The second being 
compliance with an ethical code. The third being that the order’s in the 
national interest. While I understand the first two, and we’ve spoken to 
them a little bit, the third seems to be particularly problematic.
brigety: Yes.
audience male 2: One that’s not shared by necessarily many scholars 
of civil-military relations or others. Peter Fever, for example, would speak 
of the civilian’s right to be wrong. I guess my question is, in the national 
interest as judged by whom . . . 
brigety: Yes.
audience male 2: Because indeed when a military starts to have the 
ability to independently assess what’s in the national interest, there’s certainly 
a very well-respected school of thoughts that suggest that that short circuit 
self-determination and meaningful democratic participation, and so how is 
it that you would address that? It also raises the question then of obedience, 
not purely in the practical mode that you discussed . . . 
brigety: Right.
audience male 2: . . . in terms of the necessity to execute policy . . . 
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brigety: Right. Right.
audience male 2: But also as a duty . . . 
brigety: Yes.
audience male 2: . . . in which it takes an ethical value.
brigety: Yes.
audience male 2: I was wondering if you could speak to those.
brigety: It’s a great, great question and a very hard one. Let me give 
you a couple of reasonable examples. On the one hand of the argument 
is, you know, what you’ve suggested is Peter Fever’s approach, which 
obviously has a great deal of merit, which is, if we . . . and let’s posit that 
we’re talking in American context and those that are similarly situated. 
If we live in a democracy, the people’s will must be respected and civil-
ian control of the military means that the military has to obey the policy 
direction of the elected government of the day even if one can reason-
ably debate the merits of the position that the government has taken. 
 Let me kind of . . . two very real world examples that have caused me to 
reflect about, at least that’ll show why that is problematic. We are in the year 
2017 and we still have forces in the field that are actively engaged in combat 
all over the world in a context of an authorization of use in military force 
that was authorized in 2001 for a very specific threat against Al Qaeda in 
Afghanistan, and then, which was subsequently spread to Iraq. It has spread 
more, and more, and more, and gotten thinner, and thinner, and thinner as 
we’ve gone along to the point where there have been at least some military 
officers who have taken to a greater or lesser extent, asked the question, “Do 
we still even have legally the authority to continue to actually sort of wage 
war on an increasingly sort of reed thin, you know, authorization and what is 
my responsibility as somebody who has sworn to uphold and defend, not the 
government of the day, but the Constitution of the United States to continue 
to wage war in what might otherwise be a questionable environment?” 
 Now, and that applies to, not only to sort of like kind of big, kind of macro 
question whether or not we’re going to deploy, but whether or not we have 
eyes on this particular target of this particular bad person in this particular 
country on these two dates and we have these assets that could launch these 
weapons in this environment—and oh, by the way, if we do, we think we’re 
actually going to have, you know, these sets of civilian casualties, right? 
I mean, these are actually sort of real, sort of, you know, fair questions. 
14
The International Journal of Ethical Leadership, Vol. 5 [2018], Art. 13
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/ijel/vol5/iss1/13
The International Journal of Ethical Leadership   Fall 2018 54
 I’ll give you another example, a very recent one. I’ve spent more and 
more of my time in the last decade now working on Africa. One of the 
interesting things that has happened in US engagement with Africa in 
the last decade is the creation of the US-Africa Command, which is 
now ten years old this year. One of the things that those officers and 
enlisted people do is a series of military engagements all across Africa to 
strengthen indigenous African militaries, build strategic partnerships, etc. 
As you may know, the President of the United States recently expressed 
his view about the entirety of the continent of Africa. It was not favorable. 
 If you are a major who has to go lead a training detachment in Senegal or 
Mali and amongst the things you’re doing, you know, as the end of the exer-
cise, you have a local reporter who stands up, puts a microphone in your face 
and says, “So, Major Schmotz, we understand your Commander in Chief said 
this about Africa. Do you agree with your Commander in Chief about his 
assertion about all of our military?” How are you supposed to adjudicate that 
particular, in addition to like the jujitsu of how do you think through, you 
know, media training that maybe you did or didn’t get before you left Stutt-
gart, right? I mean, how are you supposed to actively continue to develop 
a partnership when the Commander in Chief has laid out, frankly a very 
sort of different view of who your strategic partners ought to be and why? 
 I can credibly make the case that while I understand the general argu-
ment that questions of what is in the best national security interests of the 
country ought to be beyond the purview of making ethical decisions, 
particularly when it relates to potential dissent. I can also see, from real 
world examples, why frankly they ought to be, precisely because one can 
foresee the environment. This is why we’re having the whole conversation 
of dissent. One can foresee the situation in which the civilian masters or 
the civilian leadership who, in the analysis I laid out, are presumed to be 
operating in a legal and ethical way, aren’t. Thus, one could also make 
therefore the argument that perhaps the most important ethical decision 
that somebody could do at some other point down the chain is at minimum, 
flag the dissent and perhaps even sort of act on it. That’s why these are 
really hard questions. Ladies?
french: We have time for one more.
brigety: One more. Yes Ma’am?
audience female 2: Obedience is vital . . . 
brigety: I’m sorry, your name, please, and your [crosstalk] . . . 
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audience female 2: Oh, I’m sorry. Nikki Coleman. I’m from the 
Royal Australian Air Force. Go Air Force! Beat Navy!
brigety: Maybe that works down under, but we have a different way 
here.
audience female 2: No, no. I’ve lived at Annapolis. I understand. 
Obedience is vital to military culture.
brigety: Yes.
audience female 2: It’s a profession unique, and I use that very 
selectively, compared to any other professional organization or job in regards 
to obedience and having to obey orders. It’s the only profession where you 
can go to jail for disobeying a legal order.
brigety: Correct.
audience female 2: It’s vital to military culture. In Australia, we have 
value statements for the Army, Navy, Air Force, for all of the overarching 
defense. We also have one for the Defense Force Academy and we have 
value statements for various different brigades and so on. None of those 
mention obedience at all, so I don’t know how that is internationally. I’d 
like to hear if your militaries have them internationally. It begs the question, 
we want dissent obviously, because we don’t want another My Lai, or Fat 
Leonard, or Abu Ghraib. But are we ready to actually encourage dissent if 
we can’t put obedience . . . If we can’t even talk about obedience . . . 
brigety: Yes.
audience female 2: How do we then authentically talk about dissent?
brigety: Right. That’s why you are scholars and that’s what your job 
is to do. I don’t mean that to be too flippant. As much as to say that, you 
know, sometimes it is not unique to the military. Organizations often 
sometimes have the most difficulty in transforming themselves and asking 
sort of really difficult questions. Sometimes it takes people that are actually 
sort of enabled and can take some, not only by their position, if they’re a 
tenured professor or whatnot, but also by virtue of being close enough to 
the organization, but not of it, in it but not of it, to be able to ask these hard 
questions. What is clear to me is that the normal, traditional, centuries old 
framework of obedience being the stop, start, end of military life is no longer 
valuable completely unchallengeable in a current strategic environment. 
Thus, one has to grapple with these hard questions of what does appropriate 
16
The International Journal of Ethical Leadership, Vol. 5 [2018], Art. 13
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/ijel/vol5/iss1/13
The International Journal of Ethical Leadership   Fall 2018 56
dissent look like and how do we talk about it? I don’t know what the right 
answer is, but I certainly do know that, that is the appropriate question. I 
look forward to seeing additional scholarships and debates in that regard.
brigety: Thank you so much for having me. I wish to give you my 
best wishes for a great conference. Thank you.
french: We’d like to thank you again.
brigety: Thank you so much. Thank you.
french: Got a little gift for you.
brigety: Thank you.
french: Thank you for launching us so well with so many excellent 
questions and insights from your own life experience. We are very grate-
ful. I also appreciate hearing about the exciting programs and efforts at the 
Elliott School and we definitely agree that it shouldn’t be a competition. 
We want many such programs and many things blooming all over, so that 
we can get in the kind of position to challenge and ask the questions that 
need to be asked. As you just clarified, sometimes we are the only ones 
who can do that, so we have to take that role very seriously.
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